Brazil politics

Brazil(’s) state of separation

I firmly believe that a society which is democratic is one much more likely to be able to deal with the social ills of a society. I mean, a democracy is one in which minorities have rights and can express themselves through the legislative process. Tyrannies are such that minorities don't have rights, unless you happen to be aligned with the tyrant (Georg W. Bush 2005).

Brazil today is a divided country. Driving through Sao Paulo one can see the separation of society. On the one hand there are small businesses, Favelas, the daily struggle for survival. On the other hand one sees the sky scrapers, the high street filled with designer shops and guarding them are private security guards which are also policeman.

This segregation is the result of a network of embedded, autonomous and partly legitimate ties between the business and the state. The state and economic elites suppress parts of society for economic gain.

In order to illustrate this segregated suppression of parts of the civil society this essay is split into two parts.

Firstly, this essay will introduce the concept of embedded autonomy and examine in what way the executive, the legislature and judiciary contribute to the process of segregation, suppression and exploitation. Moreover, for each of the branches of the state this essay will elaborate and give examples of which structural features of the state society relations lead to the breakdown of society.

Secondly, this paper will argue that the economic development in Brazil mainly favored the richer parts of society to the cost of the poor. In order to illustrate this point, the weaknesses of the state’s economic developmental strategy will be highlighted. In addition, there will be an examination of the role economic elites play in this process.

This essay aims to show that Brazil today is a suppressive state for some parts of the society. This is due to its imperfect system of selective embedded autonomy in which the social ties between business elites together with a corrupt bureaucracy have created a state of segregation. It is arguable whether this suppression is a state policy or just the outcome of individual policies. However, this essay proposes that suppression and exclusion are real and have a pattern which tends to favor a social construct of political and business elites which are autonomous and just partly legitimately embedded in Brazil’s social society.

Embedded autonomy

In order to argue that Brazil is a state in which embedded autonomy appears selectively, having negative consequences on society, a definition of embedded autonomy is needed.

Embedded autonomy might be described as a structural basis for successful state involvement in industrial transformation in which corporations cohere but are embedded into society. This corporate coherence gives the business certain autonomy but it is embedded in “a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies”. (Evans 1995: 12)

In the case of Brazil this system is imperfect. The autonomy is certainly given but the corporations and the state are not embedded into civil society. There is no harmonious balance between them which leads to abuses by the state. Suffering under these abuses is the civil society and not the corporations.

The executives – suppression hinders harmonious state society relations

An indicator for the failure of the state to have a fostering relationship with its society is the abuses committed by the executive.

The Brazilian policy is widely known to be quite brutal and intolerant. The human rights watch states: “Police violence—including excessive use of force, extrajudicial executions, torture and other forms of ill-treatment—persists as one of Brazil’s most intractable human rights problems” (Human Rights Watch 2007: 185). These ill treatments are primarily aimed at the lower and middle classes. The corruption of the police together with the torture of prison inmates by the police is criticized and has a logical pattern (Human Rights Watch 2007: 185 – 186). If people have money then one can bribe the police and will not end up in prison being ill treated. If people do not have the money then they see the police as a state organ which does not care about their rights but just favors the rich. It is clear that such behavior leads to the de-legitimization of the executive and the perception that the inability of the state to control the executive is due to incompetence or benefits certain parts of society. For example, police violence was also common in the state of Rio de Janeiro, where police killed 520 people in the first half of 2006, according to official data describing the situations as “resistance followed by death” (Human Rights Watch 2007: 185). This example shows that the police does kill and not always guilty people which is also show by Pinheiro: “Brazilians military police is among the most deadly on the planet with 1470 civilians killed in Sao Paulo alone in the year 1992” (Pinheiro 1996: 18).  The resulting mistrust and continuing illegitimate police actions result in the assumption that the abuses do have a political or economic motivation.

This mistrust goes so far that when Brazilians were asked which institutions they trusted most the military police was ranked second lowest; just ahead of Congress (Weyland 2003: 44). This is hardly surprising. Brazil´s executive is also known for a bad civil rights score which is based on high levels of political murder and disappearances which are topped by police death squads  driving around the main cities of Brazil and killing street children (Foweraker & Krznarci 2002: 36). These actions further foster the theory that the Brazilian executive is a tool of suppression rather than justice. However, the executive can justify some of their measures by pointing towards high crime rates and the spreading gang violence. Gang violence especially has reached dimensions wherein Latin American governments cooperate because they are unable to tackle the problem alone (US International Information Programs 2005). Despite the growing gang violence, the behavior of the executive clearly shows a suppressive behavior and is aimed at the lower classes in the Brazilian society.

The abuses mentioned are all symptoms of a developing country in which civil society is divided by the state on the basis of wealth. Moreover, it shows that the concept of embedded autonomy has partly failed because there is no harmony between society and state. The economic growth further fosters inequality because more and more people are able to use the power of the executive through bribes.  

The legislature – legitimizing suppression and exclusion

As the executive, the legislature does its part to further broaden the civil cleavages in Brazil and fosters social inequality. The corruption of the legislature is one part of this process (Weyland 2003: 2).  As rich citizens manage to get special treatment for bribes, the lower classes struggle for recognition. In some parts of the country the only way to make money is through illegal activities.  This is especially true for the Favelas.  An example would be the direct link between poor living conditions and high homicide rates in shanty towns (Pinheiro 1996: 19).  To provide better living conditions and opportunities for the unemployed is clearly a task which the legislature has but hardly fulfills. This indicates a further failure of the state to foster economic development policy reaching the lower classes of society.

Another aspect concerning the legislature is its inability to pass a land reform which would end the struggle of rural violence and land conflicts. As Human Rights Watch states: “Indigenous people, landless peasants, and human rights defenders face threats, violent attacks, and killings as a result of land disputes in rural areas” (Human Rights Watch 2007: 188). These conflicts are mainly based on the dispute between rich land owners and landless peasants. This dispute existed even before Brazil was a democracy as demonstrated by Foweraker and Krznarci: “In Brazil the landowning oligarchy mobilized sufficient support within the National Constituent Assembly (1987-88) to resist calls for an agrarian reform during the process of democratic transition”(Foweraker & Krznarci 2002: 42).  Furthermore, indigenous people are struggling to keep their land which they owned even before Brazil was a state.

This interplay between political and economic elites creates a political atmosphere in which the needs of the poor are not heard. Pinheiro agrees: “(…) the election of state governments does not necessarily mean that that state institutions operate democratically” (Pinheiro 1996: 20).  This demonstrates that even though Brazil is a democratic country its citizens are not treated equally nor that the economic development in recent years has helped to harmonize state society relations as mentioned above. This threatens the legitimacy of the Brazilian state as the US International Information Program shows: “Public faith in democracy itself is under threat as governments are perceived as unable to deliver basic services such as public security” (US International Information Programs 2005). This lack of public services illustrates that the legislature does not work for the prosperity of all citizens but rather for a select group. Moreover, it legitimizes the abuses of the executive because it does not really protect the citizens which suffer under the executive. The autonomous corporate organ, fostered through the economic development policies, is clearly not embedded into all parts of civil society. Rather, it shows how certain groups misuse state organs for their own ends. As the executive, the legislature is partly an instrument of influential groups. It can be argued that they are autonomous but they are not embedded in civil society because certain policies threaten the very existence of poorer parts of the society.

The Judiciary – (in)justice and its effect on society

The judiciary, as the legislature and the executive, gets used by better off parts of the society in order to pursue its own self interest. This can be illustrated due to the fact that human rights violations in Brazil are rarely prosecuted, especially when they are committed by the executive (Human Rights Watch 2007:  188-189). This is not just the case for human rights violations but the judiciary does leave other crimes unpunished as well as discriminate against Indigenous and black Brazilians (Foweraker & Krznarci 2002: 36). This discrimination combined with corruption does further undermine the idea of embedded autonomy and alienates the poor from civil society.

A good example for this lack of justice is given by Plant: "Over one thousand assassinations have been reported in the "Grand Carajas" (Brazil) region alone over the past two decades, while only eight cases have been taken to trial and only six murderers incarcerated" (Plant 1999: 101). As show by Plant, the failure of the judiciary is not just politically motivated but it demonstrates that there is an overall lack of justice in Brazil. As a result, it comes as no surprise that an informal legal system was established. One of them is the Pasargada Resident Association which provides an informal notary service, the set up of contracts and the resolution of legal disputes (Barton 2004: 229). This indicates that key state services are not provided or are not fairly distributed, which leads to the conclusion that the combination of illegitimacy, corruption, political manipulation and inefficiency is systemic and fostered by the economic elites in order to pursue their own goals.

The economic development

The suppression and exclusion of the poor people by the Brazilian state is one effect of the process of economic development of Brazil. Since its democratization, Brazil has managed to foster an economic growth. Brazil is the biggest economic power in the region. However, at the state level the economic development tends to exclude the poor. Furthermore, the economic development is made possible through the suppression and exploitation of the lower classes. This process is fostered by the Brazilian oligarchs. Foweraker elaborates: “In Brazil, the principal families of the political elite of Minas Gerais remain especially strong, and have successfully colonized political parties and maintained control of local politics, in addition to preventing agrarian reform” (Foweraker & Krznarci 2002: 45-46). These oligarchs are barely different from those influencing the authoritarian regimes of the past (Pinheiro 1996: 20). Their economic power is not always based on legal means.

For example, in Brazil today there are still up to 40,000 force labors working for the economic prosperity of Brazil (Human Rights Watch 2007: 188).  However, this is just one effect the economic growth has had in the recent decade.

The main reasons for the economic development of Brazil in the recent years are the neo liberal policies adopted by the Brazilian government. Unfortunately, these policies saved the state money on the cost of social services which were cut back as outlined by Weyland:

“Economic globalization imposes stringent constraints on governments, making it highly unpromising and counter-productive to pursue expansionary economic policies or enact extensive public works programs or other artificial employment creation projects.” (Weyland 2003: 9-10).  

These policies hinder the lower classes rising up in economic terms because they do not have the state support which would help to improve their situation.  These policies are not always self imposed as Felice demonstrates: The “(…)International Monetary Fund(IMF)-mandated cuts of 40.5 percent in social expenditures led to reductions of 12.3 percent in education, 6.6 percent in health, 83.1 percent in the Social Action Sanitation Program, and 50 percent in the retraining programs for unemployed workers” (Felice 2002: 119). These goals were set by the IMF so Brazil would meet its obligations under international law. However, as these numbers show, a cut back of these dimensions in a country such as Brazil is disastrous. Many young people were not able to find jobs or pay their university fees (Pinheiro 1996: 20). Moreover, it proves impossible under these conditions to provide all citizens with primary health care which creates a double standard in the network of social services – one for the rich and one for the poor (Felice 2002: 232). The effect of these policies is that an astonishingly 8.5% of Brazil’s state budget goes to social services in these critical areas (Felice 2002: 235).

The International Monetary Fund was able to enforce these polices due to Brazil’s need for loans. The IMF provides these loans but not unconditionally as demonstrated above.

These economic policies show that the corporate sector is heavily supported by the state. This is due to the influences of economic elites in Brazil. It provides evidence that the corporate sector is autonomous but not embedded into all parts of society because the money which is gained by cut backs in the social sector is reinvested into private businesses.

Conclusion

This essay set out to establish causal effects caused by the imperfect system of embedded autonomy in Brazil. The inability of the state to support the lower spheres of civil society while fostering economic development leads to the assumption that the effect of this inability is partly wanted by groups of society or is even systematic. This conclusion is due to the fact that the failure of state organs to provide services has certain positive effects for the richer parts of society. These parts might be described as business elites or oligarchs.

The rights abuses of the executive are one indicator of the unequal treatment of parts of society and the existence of an imperfect system of embedded autonomy. The corruption of the executive combined with its suppression of some parts of the society suggests that people who are able to bribe the police can use the police for their own ends. This leads to a system in which the rich use the police in order to achieve their interests against the interests of weaker parts of society.

The inability of the legislature to tackle the problems of the poor in Brazil is a second indicator that state society relations are faulty and the system of embedded autonomy is imperfect. The corruption of the legislature combined with the diminishing legitimacy illustrates that the state works for the ends of certain parts of society. In other words, the economical better off do prosper further due to their ability to influence the state. In contrast, the effects of this ‘abuse’ are felt by the poor. The struggle over land reform is the best example of this injustice. The businesses are efficiently connected and organized in order to make their needs heard by the government. The poor however lack such capabilities therefore the interests of the businesses will always dominate.

The judiciary is part of the injustices mentioned above as well. As in the case of the executive and legislature, the judiciary is a victim of the abuses by the rich elites. This is managed through corruption and blackmailing.

In all three cases the rich are able to exploit state organs to their own ends. There is no mechanism in place which would protect the poor from the abuses of the rich.

This system of imperfect embedded autonomy leads to successful economic development policies but fails to address the needs of the poor. As demonstrated, the economic prosperity of Brazil is based on the cut back of social services and the exploitation of minorities. Neo liberal reforms have managed to create an economic powerhouse. However, the fuel for this economic prosperity is in part gained through a process of exploitation and exclusion of lower classes of society by businesses.

It is doubtful whether this form of economic development is sustainable due to the creation of informal state systems by the poor for the poor which undermines the legitimacy of the state itself.

Bibliography

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Evans, p. (1995) Embedded Autonomy : States and Industrial Transformation.

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Democracies: Electoral Politics and the Imperfect Rule of Law in Latin America’,

Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 44, No. 3: 29-60.

Felice, W. F. (2002) ‘The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial        Discrimination: Race, and Economic andSocial Human Rights’ in Human Rights        Quarterly 24: 205–236.

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US International Information Programs (2005, 20 April) ‘Crime Hinders Development,              Democracy in Latin America, U.S. Says USAID's Franco calls for comprehensive        approach to crime mitigation’, reviewed 19 March 2008 from                   http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2005/Apr/21-965427.html

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