cold war in Latin America

The interventions in Latin America were based on the fear that US economical interest threatened by some concepts of social democracy and justified by the threat of communism.

 

 

The world was separated in two spheres of influence after the Second World. On the one side there was the communist ideology represented Russia and on the other side was the United States of America which was regarded as the force representing democracy and the free market interests. Sometimes, these spheres were separated by a clear border in the case of East and West Germany. On the other hand, the division was just a matter of interpretation and defining communism or democracy, as in the case of Latin America. However when there was a more or less democratic regime it had a problem. The problem was that democracy allowed left forces to spread their opinion and even participating in the process of governing. This problem put the United States in a position where they had to decide how much participation of the left was still democratic hence in their favour and when a communist system is going to be established because left extremist forces tried to take over the country.

 

This problem will be illustrated throughout this essay. This essay will further argue that the reasons for intervention in Latin America by the United States was mostly motviated by own economical and domestic interests rather than by the promotion of democracy. The threat of communism was used as tool to convince people even sometimes the president of the United States to be for an intervention. But it was seldom the main reason for any intervention

 

This essay will be split into three parts, in order to illustrate to the reader that the US motivation the intervene in Latin American countries was just partly motivated to prevent communism, rather to prevent home-grown concepts of social democracy which damaged US business interests.

First, this paper will examine the coup in Guatemala. This analysis tries to show that US business interest and domestic issues in the US can lead to some drastic foreign intervention.

Second, it will be argued that the coup d’état in Brazil 1964 was a coup which was endorse by the US out of economical issues. But the coup itself grew out of the domestic situation which the US fostered.

Third, this essay argues that the involvement in the coup in the Dominican Republic was born out of the extreme fear of communism. This coup will show that the promotion of democracy comes second after the fear of communism.

Unfortunately, through the restriction of space this work can just offer an introduction of the Latin US relationship in the cold war era.

 

 

US tools of power

 

Many scholars were unaware of the US secrete operations in Latin America (Grover 1988: 363). But these secrete operations was a tools to make US’s voice heard on the Latin continent. The United Sates with its School of Americas which produced many of the military leaders which overthrew the democratic regimes and killed many innocent people is another tool which the US used to promote its own interest (Gill 2004: 189). These people were known for their involvement in coups and widespread repression (Mc Coy 2005: 49). With the promotion of military juntas did the US promoted the imprisoning of thousands and promoted the downfall of democracy in many countries.

 

United Fruit against democracy

 

The economical situation of Guatemala was hopeless for the majority of the citizens at the end of the Second World War. This situation got even more critical when the United States crushed all hopes of financial aid for Latin America as Europe received it. There would be no Marshal Plan for Latin America (Smith 1976: 142).

The Agricultural workers which made up the majority of the population earned less than $100 per year. Two percent of the population owned 70% of the argrable land and 70% of the population was illiterate (Rabe and Hill 1988: 43).

 

All these factors illustrate that Guatemala was depended on the assistance of the US government. The United States were very afraid that Latin America would become a sphere of influence for communist forces. These fears got even bigger when trough the first peaceful transition of power Jacob Arbenz Guzman was elected president with 60% of the votes in the year 1951 (Rabe and Hill 1988: 44). President Eisenhower too was afraid that this election could trigger the first communist regime in Latin America into power (Rabe and Hill 1988: 42; Schoultz 1998: 336). But it was not just communism president Eisenhower feared. It was also the fear about the business interests the United States had in the small country. These interests were mainly represented by the UFC (United Fruit Company). The UFC was the largest landowner, the biggest employer and the company subsidised the railway system (Schoultz 1998: 337; Rabe and Hill 1988: 45). If the population would be aware how a foreign company was responsible for the inequality in the country than there would be demands for changed. It was exactly these demands which brought Guzman into power. “In his inaugural address he pledged to create an economically independent modern capitalist state” (Rabe and Hill 1988: 44). This was hardly the tone of a future communist ruler who would abolish democracy and the capitalist state. He was in favour of capitalism.

 

This clearly indicates that he was no communist even though that he was from the left wing. And even this left wing was not really under the threat of the communist ideology. The State Department believed that there were around 1000 ‘real’ communists in Guatemala ((Rabe and Hill 1988: 45). To speak from a communist threat from this regime is therefore hardly justified. Guzman did not even appoint any communist friendly individuals into key departments such as military, police, and the foreign office (Rabe and Hill 1988: 47). Guzman was very aware of the paranoia of the US officials of any communist forces in Guatemala. The facts above really support the claim that there is no threat of communism for Guatemala or the United States of America.

 

Never less since 1947 there were constant reports by the US embassy in Guatemala that communism and Marxism reaches a point where it would get dangerous (Schoultz 1998: 338). These reports reached a dimension which can be described as misinformation or propaganda. By 1949 for example, reports did reach the US issued by the embassy in Guatemala that even the literacy program which was aimed at the education people was a propaganda method of communism (Schoultz 1998: 339). All these misinformation was meant to discredit the regime in Guatemala and to distract from the real interests the US had in the Central American country. The main problem between the United States and Guatemala identified by foreign ministry of Guatemala was not communism but UFC (Rabe and Hill 1988: 47).

 

This problem was worsened in the eyes of the United States when Guzman introduced the wanted and urgently needed reforms. He introduced the nation first labour union, set up a national labour conference, launched a welfare program and ‘worst’ he started an agrarian reform which involved the redistribution of 40% of the land owned by the UFC (Schoultz 1998: 337; Rabe and Hill 1988: 45). These reforms were feared by the UFC. The land which Guzman meant to redistribute was pure money. The redistribution was in favour of the large amount of landless farmers and not in favour of US Guatemalan relations.  From 1952 to 1954 1.5 million acres of land was distributed to 100,000 families (Rabe and Hill 1988: 44-45).

 

The UFC reacted to these reforms by lobbing. Decisions were made quickly because the president of the UFC was conveniently the brother of the president of the US (Schoultz 1998: 337). But these were just one of the ties between the US government and UFC. Schoultz argues that there were many powerful ties (Schoultz 1998: 338). The politicians argued that there was communism on the rise in Guatemala. But up to the year 1954 the US had little prove that the communists were in Guatemala (Rabe and Hill 1988: 47; Schoultz 1998: 342). The administration however believed different. In 1954 US backed forces entered the capitol and overthrew the democratic elected government (Rabe and Hill 1988: 56; Schoultz 1998: 343). The new president promptly reversed all the reforms and welcomed US oil investors.

 

This episode in the US Latin American relations is indicator that the only worry the US Government had was profit not ideology. This paper does not picture the coup of 1954 as a republican victory over communism as Eisenhower officially did (Schoultz 1998: 343). It nearly shows that a democratic elected leader which interests was to give the people part of the resources of the country was overthrown because these resources were critical for the US economy.

Most scholars would agree that the US intervention in Guatemala was in order to rescue UFC (Rabe and Hill 1988: 58). The US chose to disregard the democratic wish of the people and put a military junta into power just to make sure that the US and UFC would keep profiting from Guatemala at the costs of the people.

 

Brazil

 

The story of the coup d’état in 1964 in Brazil is another example in which the United States preferred a military dictatorship which was hard on communism and accepted every economical advice than a democratic leader which preferred its own way than a democracy. When in 1961 Jânio Quadros resigned as the elected president of Brazil João Goulart was meant to be his successor (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 168). But that was a big problem for president Goulart. In the eyes of the military and some parts of the population he was not legitimized (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 169- 170).  He was in big trouble domestically and internationally. Brazil’s economy was severely under threat by inflation. Another problem was that in the period from 1945 till 1965 the lower and middle class sectors of the Brazilian society gained more weight which lead to an increasing importance of popularity and resulted in polarization (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 166). This polarization began even before Goulart became president but made it quite difficult for him to unite the country under his rule.

 

He was from the left therefore did the religious and political elite opposed him publically (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 156). But they were not the only ones. The United states were against him because they saw Brazil as a bottomless pit in which all the aid just disappears and this would be the case until there would be successful economical reforms (Phyllis 1974: 46). Further, he was isolated through the noncompliance with the reform demands of the US and the Organization of American States (OAS), which also brought local politicians up against him (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 170). All these issues made his governing appear to be weak and unsuccessful. The right despised him for being on the left and the left did not agreed with him because his programs were not radical enough to change the system (Phyllis 1974: 49).

 

What he did on the other hand was quite impressive keeping in mind what a tremendous pressure he was under. His plan was a more equal distribution of wealth and an independent role of Brazil in the international sphere (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 156).  He also put a cap on the profit maximisation of foreign enterprises, introduced the State monopole on oil imports and exports, started the revision of mining concessions in non Brazilian hands, launched an agrarian reform and tried unsuccessfully to fix minimum wages and maximum prices in order to fight inflation him (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 202-203). All the measures put into place were well intended but were not able to stop the economical crisis Brazil was in. This crisis had two sides. First, the economy was mismanaged and was not able to compete successfully on the world market. Second, Goulart blamed the terms of trade for the bad economical situation which demanded that a $3.8 billion dollar dept should be paid by 1954 which was impossible for the economy to handle (Phyllis 1974: 50).

 

These demands were to this time just unreasonable and were aimed to further discredit the Goulart government. Another example for this method of pressuring the Goulart regime in economical terms to provoke an overthrow included the economical policy of ‘island of economical sanity’ which was put into place by the United States. This policy said that there would be no direct financial help to the government rather to special selected projects (Phyllis 1974: 48). This policy showed the people that the government was unable to help them and that a foreign power had to intervene directly to improve their life. Hench did the legitimacy of the government fell. There was no program of loans negotiated while Goulart was in the government which demonstrated the hostile economical policy by the US (Phyllis 1974: 93).

 

This isolation forced Goulart to look for help somewhere else. In 1963 the Soviets offered to provide transport planes to the Brazilian air force  which was regarded as a swing towards communism by the white house (Phyllis 1974: 53). Another step to improve the economical situation was to the opening of a trade office of the people’s republic of China (Phyllis 1974: 53). These two actions were necessary to free the Brazil government out of the ‘economical boycott’ it was under. But Goulart did in no way take measures against the capitalist system it rather globalised it in order the balance the debt the state was under (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 202). This is a clear indicator that Goulart was no communist regime. Further prove for this argument is that the left despised Goulart because he did not take any measures to alter the system and make it more communistic as mentioned above.

 

Further, in March 17 1964 did the assistant secretary of state Mann issued a doctrine which said that the US would no longer punish military juntas for overthrowing democratic regimes and he further emphasised that economical growth, the protection of us investment and the opposition of communism were the key interests of the US (Phyllis 1974: 61-62). This can be seen as the start shot of the military coup. The United States were aware of this coup and were also involved in its execution (Phyllis 1974: 103-104). It can be said that the US welcomed this military coup warmheartedly (Pastor 1992: 195, Pastor 2001: 231).

 

After this endorsement for the military did the coup began:

“In the early morning of April 1, the president of the Brazilian senate (…) without a congressional vote declared the Brazilian presidency vacant. The president of the supreme court, without a vote of that court, presided over the swearing-in of an interim president, Paschoal Ranieri Mazzilli, president of the Chamber of Deputies” (Phyllis 1974: 79).This was the formal start of the coup. But the first military actions of the United States started already on March 31^st (Phyllis 1974: 75-76). The US supported the military which executed the coup d’état which several cover operations and special forces and the US ambassador Gordan actively lobbied actively against the president by trying to persuade the former president and other influential politicians to use their forces to legitimacy the coup (Phyllis 1974: 75-78).

 

After the coup happen, the US did sent a special task force to improve the economical situation in the country and the first telegram by to US to the embassy was about the financial situation and how to improve it (Phyllis 1974: 80-81). All these facts hint to the assumption that the threat of communism was not the main factor for the US to support the coup. It rather leads to the assumption that the economical situation in Brazil did lead to the disadvantage of the US economy and therefore did the US support the coup. Some authors like Eduardo Galeano argue that Goulart was not overthrown; he just ‘fell’ because of his inability to lead the country (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 201).  Other like Phyllis have a more reasonable explanation: “There is evidence that US aid further weakened an already weak central government, not only by withholding assistance from the Goulart government which US policy makers felt would not or could not handle aid responsibly, but also by effectively by bypassing the government (Phyllis 1974: 99). The president of the United States in conversation with the secretary of state illustrate that there was no threat of communism even so when the president believed it at the time. The foreign affairs committee knew better:

 

“President: don’t let it go Communist.

Rusk: That’s right. And I talked to Bob McNamara to lay on some tankers to get some POL supplies and other things on the way.

(…)

Rusk: Now I have also, we had an unfortunate accident today. The House Foreign Affairs Committee put out a report on, that included some references to Brazil, a report that was prepared last January, that included a reference to the fact that we did not expect an early Communist takeover in Brazil” (Foreign Relations 1964: nr. 193).

 

This conversation clearly shows that the president was aware that the coup is on the way and he orders his secretary of state to help to overthrow a government which was not a communist one. The reason for the intervention was economically which supports the thesis of this essay that the intervention of the US in Brazil was not a matter of the prevention of communism but rather a matter to fight a democratic president which was not able or willing to apply with the US demands and severely threatened US economical interests.

 

Dominican Republic

 

The example of the coup d’état in the Dominican Republic will show that the fear of a second Cuba and the economical sanctions on Cuba aided the military which wanted to overthrow the democratic elected government in the Dominicans. Lowenthal aggress and measures the events as a failure of the US to promote democracy (Lowenthal 1991: 191).

 

When the Trujillo dictatorship ended and in the February 1963 Juan Bosch was elected the expectations of the populations were high. But there were also social tensions in which made it hard for the government to find a common base. Further was most of the country in a pre industrial state which made it hard for the government to be independent from foreign aid (Fage and Cornelious 1970: 233).

President Bosch had as the presidents of Guatemala and Brazil a big variety of oppositional forces to struggle against. Is opposition consist of a variety of business man, the military and US officials which were frustrated by his nationalism, his pessimistic administrative style and his lack of enthusiasm over opposing communism democracy (Lowenthal 1991: 197).  As the Secretary of State for economic affairs Mann put it: “Bosch is no good” (Foreign Relations 1964: nr.22). A big fear of the US was that the Dominicans would transform into a second Cuba. As in the other countries mentioned the US focus was rather on the prevention of communism rather the promotion of democracy (Lowenthal 1991: 198).

 

Bosch was a quite able leader who set up a constitution which created a secular state, the protection of workers, he maintained security, introduced individual liberties and he preached fiscal equality. Rabe called him an honest man and a democrat (Rabe 1999: 45).  HE was a president who tried to unite the society and struggle forward to industrialize his country and promote capitalism. The main reason for the assumption that Bosch is a communist was the ambassador of the US.

He was an inexperienced person who wanted to overthrow Bosch since his election because he pictured him as a democratic monster.  Reason for that is that Bosch was against communism but did not denounce communism as often as the rightwing elites liked (Rabe 1999: 46).

 

Further, the state’s economy was destroyed by the price of sugar which was so low because of the actions taken by the US against Cuba. The fear in the white house was that if they would help the economy by raising the sugar price they would ‘lift Fidel Castro back into the saddle’ (Foreign Relations 1964: nr.22). When the coup finally came in 1964 the US was aware of it and actually in favour because nobody in the US government wanted Bosch in power (Rabe 1999: 47; Lowenthal 1991: 198).

 

All these events show that: Juan Bosch fell from power for domestic reasons, but the administrations statements against Bosch encouraged the military to strike (Rabe 1999: 47).  The events in the Dominicans show that the US diplomats encouraged the military to strike against a democratic elected president just in order to prevent any influence of communism and to promote a future regime which would speak in favour of US policy. What they did not do was to promote democracy or tried to improve the economical situation because of their fear of communism.

 

Conclusion

 

The US intervention in these three countries illustrate that the interest of the US was split in two interest groups.

First, the US was more in favour of military juntas because from their point of view is a military junta more able than a democracy to fight communism and to work in their favour. Especially when it was hard to divide between a democratic country in which a leftist government ruled and a democratic country which turned communist.

Second, the US economical interests always came first. When there was a democratic ruler which tried to pursue an own economical way or tried to use the national resources to help their own country, the US was intervening under the excuse that the state might turn communist.

 

Another aspect of the US policy towards their backyard was that home-grown socialism was quite often seen as a threat to their understanding of democracy. There was always a certain paranoia which made it easy for certain interest groups to push for a military intervention. It would have look badly for a politician in these times to state that he was against an interference of the US because he knew that home-grown socialism is neither threat to democracy nor the US. Another factor is the domino theory which made the US foreign policy takes extreme measures just to prevent any country to go communist. After the takeover of Fidel in Cuba the US did think that now every Latin American country would turn red.

 

It is an unanswered question how many people actually knew about the US business interests in these countries and how many were just made to agree by repeating that certain countries would go communist any second. In the end is it questionable if communism would have been worst for the people of Latin America than the military juntas. But that did not matter for US policy makers the threat of communism and the threat to their economical boom was enough to intervene into democratic countries.

 

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