Innovation Game vs. Regular Game Theory

Dalziel, 2007 identified the four players of innovation game. “Firms, governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations.” (p.191). “Games of innovation are sets of rules that structure meso-level innovation systems composed of organizational actors that compete and collaborate to create value.” (Miller & Floricel, 2007 p.1).  According to Dalziel, some management scholars are reluctant to include nonprofit organizations in the four categories of innovation game players.  “Of the four, nonprofit organizations are the least well understood.” (Dalziel, 2007 p.191).  This researcher believes that the reason why some scholars are reluctant to classify nonprofits in the innovation game players is that; innovation game is reviewed as a collaboration of organizations whereby inter-functional relations are built to compete and create knowledge, capabilities, products and services for customers (Miller & Floricel as cited in Dalziel, 2007 p. 191).  This argument is further described below:

First, the production of goods are solely the role of for profit organizations; second Patent  creation and registration must be the sole responsibility of for profit organizations and therefore, nonprofit organizations should be excluded in the four categories of innovation game players. “The race to the patent office game in which patent portfolios are the key firm resources, has been observed in both the semiconductor and the biotechnology industries.” (Dalziel, 2007 p.192).

Furthermore, because Dalziel categorizes nonprofits as innovation game players he defines innovation related nonprofit organizations as “organizations whose mandates are scientific, technological, or business related.” (Dalziel, 2007 p.193). To clarify his point, Dalziel went on to distinguish between innovation related nonprofits from other nonprofit organizations.  Dalziel gave detail illustration and attributes of innovation related nonprofits as well as other nonprofits.

In addition, Dalziel explained the role of institutional enablers and how they play a unique role within an organization to create and model networks in the institutional markets that the organizations do business.  “Institutional enablers increase the focal firm’s ability to innovate by shaping the networks and markets in which the firm engages.” (Dalziel, 2007 p.204).  These institutional enablers shape networks and markets in four different ways.  First, according to Dalziel, institutional enablers shape and create networks to identify and qualify agents; second institutional enablers facilitate the creation and strengthening of ties between agents; third, they facilitate network closures, and finally institutional networks facilitate inter-network brokerage. 

Also, Dalziel has spent some time discussing institutional balancers and what they do to ensure proper costs allocation within an organization.  They help form stakeholder groups by introducing similar agents to one another.  “Institutional balancers work to ensure that firms bear the full cost of their activities, including costs that would otherwise be borne by other agents.” (Dalziel, 2007 p.207).

In conclusion, innovation game theory emphasizes on a philosophy that something must drive a firm’s willingness to innovate and compete efficiently in the global market; hence the involvement of institutional enablers and balancers.  It is clear that these two forces expose and challenge organizations to innovate in order to stay competitive.  Customers benefit from the end result of innovation game because; it leads to better quality and lower prices of goods and services.   In addition to classifying firms, governments, and universities, as innovation game players, the position of nonprofit organizations as innovation game players is still questionable.  Dalziel fails to provide empirical work as to why nonprofit organizations should be considered innovation game players.  This is the first area that the reviewer hopes may inspire further research. What Dalziel also fails to point out is the affiliation of these enablers and balancers.  Enablers and balancers, are they independent entities or they are formed within an organization to increase the focal firm’s ability to innovate and to ensure that the costs that organizations incur are appropriate in the innovation game process?  So, the second area that this reviewer hopes will inspire further research is the true identify of institutional enablers and balancers.  Who do they report to? And so on.

References

Dalziel, M. (2007).  Games of Innovation: The Roles of Nonprofit Organizations.

            International Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 11, No.1.  Retrieved

March 14, 2008 from Argosy University Online Library, Business Source Premier.

Miller, R. & Floricel, S. (2007).  Games of Innovation: A New Theoretical Perspective. 

International Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 11, No. 1.  Retrieved March 15, 2008 from Argosy University Online Library, Business Source Premier.